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1 THE CLIMATE CHANGE CHALLENGE 
 
Recent evidence suggests that the climate 
change impacts resulting from a stabilisation 
of CO2 concentrations at 550ppm – the basis 
for the UK’s 60% target - may have been 
previously underestimated and should be 
avoided if at all possible.  There is growing 
concern that even current concentrations of 
381ppm are beginning to cause significant 
damage.  Concentrations are increasing at 
around 2ppm per year, and it will now be 
impossible to avoid 400ppm.  Although 
550ppm will itself be a huge challenge, it now 
seems increasingly likely that the international 
community will need to set a much lower 
acceptable limit, possibly around 450ppm. 
 
The central message is that any level of CO2 
above pre-industrial levels can be expected to 
cause undesirable effects on the global 
climate, and the risk of severe and potential 
runaway effects increases with every increase 
in concentration levels. 
 
As there is a well understood link between the 
amount of CO2 we release into the atmosphere 
and the risk of severe climate change, we will 
at some point need to decide what 
concentration level is acceptable and then act 
accordingly to stay within this cap. Such an 
approach will need to have regard for the rate 
of emissions reduction that is technically 
feasible, employing a bottom-up approach. 
 
The basis for climate change policy cannot be 
framed in terms of simple ‘cost-benefit 
analysis’, but must be based on whether the 
net costs of a cost-effective strategy to tackle 
climate change represent a ‘reasonable 
insurance premium’ against the effects of 
climate change, and against fossil fuel price 
rises and scarcity. Attempts to calculate a 
social cost of carbon based on marginal 
damage are likely to severely underestimate 
the more serious effects of severe climate 
change impacts. 
 
The potential gravity of the effect of rising CO2 
concentrations, and the cumulative and 
potentially irreversible nature of the process 
makes a strong ‘a priori’ case for invoking the 
precautionary principle – making sure that 
policy options allow for early and effective 
action to reduce emissions even though it 
would be decades before any benefits became 
evident. 
 
Classic economic theory (by which deep cuts in 
carbon emissions could theoretically be 
validated by establishing the intersection 
between the rising marginal cost of CO2 
abatement and falling marginal benefit in 
order to indicate the ‘optimum’ emission 
reduction and the “acceptable cost” of doing 
so) may well prove to be unworkable in this 
case because: 
 
• the degree of uncertainty creates very 
large numbers of potential 
intersections over many decades; 
• over time, marginal abatement costs 
might fall (through innovation), and 
marginal abatement benefits might 
rise (if the consequences of cumulative 
irreversibility become more evident);  
• the quantification of the benefits of 
abatement decades hence is much 
more difficult than quantification of 
the costs (even though that itself is 
not easy). 
 
The argument that meeting the climate 
change challenge will result in unacceptable 
‘economic damage’ completely ignores the 
virtually incalculable economic damage from 
severe climate change effects. What we need 
is a form of economic growth that embraces 
sustainable development principles – 
stimulating enough economic activity to 
generate improved well-being while living 
within environmental limits. 
 
It is worth noting 2 commentators – Mike 
Parker in a paper presented in Nov 2005, and 
Clive Hamilton (in Growth Fetish)  who both 
highlight the minimal impact on GDP of 
moving to a low carbon economy.  As Mike 
Parker puts it: 
 
“..studies by and for the DTI suggest that 
the effect of a “low carbon strategy” 
would be to lower GDP by 2050 by some 
0.5%-2%: equivalent to less than one 
year’s growth of GDP, which can be 
expected to expand two-or-three fold 
over the next half century.  If that proved 
to be the outcome, there would be little 
difficulty in arguing that the strategy 
represented a reasonable “insurance 
premium” since there would be no real 
problem of affordability, since it is too 
small materially to affect the economic 
growth rate as a whole… “ 
2 POTENTIAL POLICY RESPONSES 
 
 
Given this context, the SDC submission is 
based on three main interdependent points 
which are all based on or stem from our work 
on Redefining Prosperity: 
 
• Decoupling energy use and economic 
growth 
• Internalising external costs 
• Capping emissions and trading: a 
carbon-constrained economy 
 
2.2 Decoupling economic growth 
and energy use 
In broad policy terms, the Government’s 
favoured strategy for maintaining economic 
growth on a more sustainable basis is to 
improve resource productivity – getting more 
economic value from each unit of production, 
thus ’decoupling‘ economic growth from 
increased resource use.   
 
This strategy appears to offer a relatively 
painless route to a cleaner environment 
without in any way jeopardising macro-
economic priorities. It is far more attractive to 
concentrate efforts on the supply side (seeking 
technological changes that improve efficiency 
of resource use) than it is to confront problems 
of demand management. 
 
The Government’s ‘decoupling indicators’ 
show that this has happened in many 
important respects including many polluting 
emissions (sulphur dioxide, ozone-depleting 
gases, nitrogen oxides and carbon monoxide), 
and the UK’s total material requirement which 
grew by 12% between 1970 and 1999 whilst 
GDP increased by 88% during the same 
period.  However much of this shift is 
attributed to the shift from manufacturing to 
service industries and does not reflect the 
energy embodied in imported goods: just 
because we no longer produce energy-
intensive goods in the UK we are not absolved 
from responsibility for the emissions and other 
environmental and social impacts associated 
with their production. 
 
With greenhouse gas emissions, the race so 
far is pretty much a dead heat: efficiency 
improvements in buildings are just about 
keeping pace with increases in consumption. 
In road and air transport, however, efficiency 
gains are not managing even this: increases in 
consumption are outrunning efficiency 
improvements by a factor of at least nine.  
Research by the Tyndall Centre shows that 
moderate growth by the aviation sector would 
fill the UK’s total carbon allowance if we set 
ourselves a cap consistent with stabilisation at 
450ppm. 
 
It is therefore clear that a reliance on 
conventional improvements in resource 
efficiency (or more specifically ‘carbon 
intensity’) will not deliver the substantial cuts 
in CO2 emissions that are required. Indeed, it 
seems unlikely that the decoupling trend is 
likely to continue in the same way as over the 
past 30 years (given that certain structural 
changes will not occur again) without 
intervention either by government or through 
a large and sustained increase in energy 
prices. The challenge facing government is 
therefore how to intervene to ensure far 
greater resource productivity, whilst 
simultaneously ensuring that low carbon 
energy supplies are brought into the energy 
mix.  
 
Evidence gathered in the review of the 
Climate Change Programme shows that 
energy efficiency achieved in households is 
often being offset by the “rebound effect”, 
whereby savings in energy use are offset by 
increased use of energy-consuming 
appliances.  As more and more appliances 
become commonplace, this trend is likely to 
have increasing significance despite overall 
reductions in demand as a result of active 
energy efficiency policy implementation. 
 
2.3 Internalising external costs 
The SDC believes the Stern Review needs to 
look at some of the inherent and fundamental 
issues that are inhibiting really significant 
progress in tackling climate change.  Such a 
broad Review should not confine itself to the 
status quo, but should examine critically the 
decades of perverse subsidies and the 
“licensed externalisation of costs” to keep 
energy prices low.  The cumulative affect of 
these failures has been perversely low fossil 
fuel prices, and so neither producers nor 
consumers are required to pay for the full cost 
of their actions. The environmental cost of 
energy use in the UK will be paid for by future 
generations, globally, in coping with the 
effects of climate change. 
 
This transfer of costs is contrary to the 
principles of sustainable development, and 
should be seen as a significant and entirely 
illegitimate subsidy for the present-day 
industry and consumers.  It also creates a 
decidedly un-level playing field when 
comparing the costs of action on climate 
change against alternative options based on 
continued use of fossil fuels with their 
externalized climate change costs. 
 
We recommend that the Stern Review 
thoroughly examines the potential impact on 
products and services when the costs of 
climate change are internalised into fossil fuel 
prices.  By offering an alternative analysis to 
the conventional approach, Government could 
begin to see a way of moving ahead on this 
agenda in a way that will build long-term 
sustainability into policy making processes.  
Resource flow accounting will also need to be 
a part of this analysis, and we would 
recommend further work to reveal the true 
impacts of imported products and services on 
the UK’s overall level of responsibility for 
carbon emissions.  
 
2.4 Capping emissions and trading: 
a carbon-constrained economy 
The two overarching goals of sustainable 
development are living within environmental 
limits, and ensuring a strong, healthy and just 
society. These core principles are key to 
determining an upper limit to CO2, recognising 
that we are already past a safe concentration 
and that any level should aim to avoid the 
worst predictions of climate change scientists 
(for example, the IPCC Assessment Reports). 
 
To accurately value and therefore internalise 
carbon emissions into economic decisions, a 
price for carbon needs to be determined. This 
price is meaningless unless it is directly related 
to the scarcity of the resource it is meant to 
represent.  Fixing an upper limit on the supply 
of carbon (in terms of what we are collectively 
permitted to emit in total) will create the 
demand for it, resulting in a price of carbon 
that reflects the marginal abatement cost of 
reducing CO2 emissions, as experienced by the 
end user. 
 
A market-determined price of carbon is 
inherently more robust than attempts to 
determine it empirically, as only the traders in 
the market will know what cost is necessary to 
stimulate a certain level of action. This is what 
lies behind cap and trade schemes, or 
‘emissions trading’, in which carbon emissions 
are capped and the market sets the price. 
However, the current EU Emissions Trading 
Scheme (EUETS) relies on a cap set only for 
short periods, and does not currently base this 
cap on an estimation of the absolute reduction 
in emissions that is needed as part of a long-
term strategy. It therefore follows that the 
price of carbon resulting is not a true price of 
carbon, as it has not sufficiently limited the 
‘resource’ being traded. 
 
An efficient and effective emissions trading 
scheme would need to have a long-term cap, 
which could then be divided by the number of 
years or blocks of years within which the cap 
has to be met, creating distinct carbon 
budgets over set periods. This would allow the 
market to price carbon within each period, 
whilst having full information on the final 
outcome and long-term scarcity of the 
resource and hence an expectation of prices in 
future periods.   
 
Emissions trading can be upstream or 
downstream, or somewhere in-between.  
Upstream emissions trading would allocate 
emissions rights to fuel producers and 
importers, who would then establish a market 
for carbon between themselves and pass the 
resulting cost of carbon on to their customers 
(mainly power generators, refineries, and 
industry). This cost would be passed down 
through the economy to final consumers. This 
approach in effect works like a tax, with 
emissions reductions encouraged solely 
through the price mechanism. 
 
Downstream emissions trading could take a 
number of forms, but taking a strict definition 
would involve the allocation of emissions 
rights to the final end-user – individuals and 
businesses. 
 
The current EUETS falls into an in-between 
category, with emissions rights allocated to 
some industrial end-users and the power 
generating sector, but not to SMEs or 
individuals. As a result it only covers a 
proportion of the emissions in the economy. 
Even if this is extended to other industrial 
sectors and aviation, the EUETS cannot be 
classified as a proper downstream scheme, as 
for most individuals and businesses it relies on 
an indirect price effect, and does not allow 
them to take part in the market. 
 
The SDC  believes a more comprehensive 
emissions trading scheme, (ultimately 
covering all sectors of the economy including 
individuals) will need to be the way forward.  
Current policies for tackling climate change are 
not designed to make fundamental changes 
like this: they are designed only to make 
incremental improvements to existing policies, 
and overcome perceived barriers.  Thus the 
Energy Efficiency Commitment could not be 
converted into an emissions trading scheme, it 
will need to be redesigned completely so it 
can move in the direction of trading over time.  
 
We would recommend therefore that pilot 
programmes in householder trading are 
trialled to identify the advantages and 
problems associated with such a mechanism.  
In the meantime it would be preferable to 
explore ways of liberalising access to EEC by 
players other than energy suppliers, to begin 
to engage other bodies interested in the 
business opportunities of saving carbon 
emissions from households. 
 
The SDC is also extremely supportive of a 
proposal being considered as part of the 
Climate Change Programme Review to 
introduce a mandatory UK ETS for business and 
the public sector.  Analysis by the Carbon 
Trust1 shows interesting results if such a 
scheme covered major retailers, building 
managers and the public sector, where a 
combination of auctioning allowances, and a 
rebate on the Climate Change Levy (80% in 
the first year) would cover any additional cost 
to business.  The Carbon Trust estimates that 
such a scheme could save 2.5MtC/yr by 2010, 
rising to 5MtC/yr by 2020. A mandatory UK 
ETS  could also be expanded to cover the 
sectors with Climate Change Agreements 
when they expire in 2008, and to other sectors 
such as the agricultural or haulage sectors.  It 
would also be highly complementary to the 
downstream emissions trading outlined above. 
                                                
1 The UK Climate Change Programme: Potential 
evolution for business and the public sector. Carbon 




The SDC believes that an economy that moves 
earlier towards a low carbon economy, 
through efficiency measures and technology 
transformation, is one that will over the 
medium term reveal itself to have a 
competitive advantage.  Global businesses are 
seizing the opportunities to reduce energy 
waste by early investment in more efficient 
technologies, and by improved and sustained 
good energy management practices, and they 
recognise that their ongoing cost savings are 
helping to make them more competitive than 
other businesses in the field.  We firmly 
believe that this should be the thesis followed 
by the UK as an economy, to enable us to gain 





























Analysts such as the Carbon Trust have good 
evidence that achieving a 20% cut in carbon 
emissions by 2010 is possible and is cost 
effective in the business sector.  Similarly in 
the household sector the overall savings to the 
economy in saving energy far outstrip the 
costs of implementing energy efficiency 
programmes.  However Government needs to 
recognise that more intervention is needed to 
begin influencing peoples’ behaviour and 
understanding of the impacts of their 
behaviours and choices, and be willing to 
make more policy interventions to tackle 
these barriers2. 
                                                
2 Further thinking on immediate policy 
interventions is contained in the SDC response to 
the Climate Change Programme Review 
 
